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THE INSANITY DEFENSE UNDER SIEGE:
LEGISLATIVE ASSAULTS AND
LEGAL REJOINDERSt
Joseph H. Rodriguez, Esq. *
Laura M. LeWinn, Esq.**
Michael L. Perlin, Esq.***
No aspect of our legal system has engendered a more intense level of
debate than the role of the insanity defense in the criminal justice process.
The hundreds of articles published in the weeks following the Hinckley' ver-
dict illustrate the degree of public concern about the manner in which the
defense is employed. The intensity of this concern has obscured some fun-
damental realities about the operation of the insanity defense mechanism.
The defense actually plays a valuable role in the current judicial system, and
it is seldom abused. To prove this point, this Article will examine how the
defense is used, its true role in the entire scheme of jurisprudence, and-most
importantly-what really happens after the insanity defense is pleaded.
I. THE LAW IN NEW JERSEY
The insanity defense lies at the cutting edge between the criminal law
and mental health systems, and becomes the focal point of public scrutiny
whenever there is an event which seems to indicate that the two systems are
out-of-sync. Underlying the defense is the central ethical question in the entire
criminal justice system: how does our society assign responsibility for an in-
dividual's anti-social acts? This question, which has plagued the system for
centuries, is a profoundly important one which goes to our basic moral con-
cepts of guilt and innocence.
t A portion of this Article is adopted from testimony delivered on August
5, 1982, to the New Jersey State Senate Judiciary Committee by Commissioner Rodriguez.
Following the receipt of that testimony, the Senate Committee rejected all efforts
to abolish the insanity defense or to modify it. That testimony is excerpted at 110
N.J.L.J. 453 (1982). Brief sections of this Article also appeared in Perlin, Whose
Plea Is It Anyway? Insanity Defense Myths and Realities, 79 PHI.ADELPHIA MED. 5 (1983).
• Commissioner, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.
•* Acting Director, Division of Mental Health Advocacy, New Jersey Depart-
ment of the Public Advocate.
•** Special Counsel to the Commissioner, New Jersey Department of the Public
Advocate. The authors also wish to acknowledge the assistance of J. Benedict Centifanti,
Law Clerk, Penelope A. Boyd, Esq., and Patrick Reilly in the preparation of this Article.
1. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), opinion clarified,
reconsideration denied, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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Despite a rising tide of criticism, New Jersey has chosen to retain the
insanity defense. In 1975 and again in 1982 this issue was debated at great
length before the State Legislature as one aspect of an overall criminal code
law reform effort.' The Legislature listened to days of testimony and debate
and studied parallel law reform efforts in other jurisdictions, such as New
York and Michigan, before rejecting a proposal to abolish the insanity defense.'
The legislators found, first, that the insanity defense is rarely used and second,
that defendants who successfully plead insanity are confined for longer periods
than defendants found to be sane and thereafter convicted of the same crime.'
Satisfied that the defense is not a source of abuse, the New Jersey legislators
concluded that it plays a necessary part in a just law enforcement system.
In a parallel development, the New Jersey Supreme Court was one of
the nation's first judicial bodies to articulate procedures to accompany find-
ings of "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI). State v. Krol,5 State v.
Fields, and State v. Carter,7 are comprehensive analyses of the requirements
and consequences of the NGRI defense. Krol established the minimal constitu-
tional requirements that must be met before a defendant found NGRI may
be committed. Commitment must be keyed to a finding that the person is
dangerous to himself or society, not merely to the finding of insanity.' The
supreme court pointed out:
2. Ironically, the United States Congress has undertaken similar deliberations.
In 1975 and 1976, the United States Senate spent months debating a massive criminal
law reform omnibus bill which included a provision abolishing the insanity defense.
See S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For a full analysis Of the relevant portions
of the bill, see Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "A bolish" the Insanity Defense
in S.I: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687 (1976). That provision died
in committee after extensive scrutiny and consideration. See 34 CONG. Q. 586 (Mar.
13, 1976); 33 CONG. Q. 2385 (Nov. 8, 1975).
3. New Jersey's consideration of abolition of the insanity defense is discussed
in Cohen, The New Jersey Insanity Defense: Present and Proposed, 2 CRIM. JUST.
Q. 38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The New Jersey Insanity Defense]; and Cohen,
In Defense of the Insane: A Proposal to Abolish the Defense of Insanity, 2 CRiM.
JUST. Q. 127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as In Defense of the Insane].
4. See infra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
5. 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
6. 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574 (1978).
7. 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
8. 68 N.J. at 259-61, 344 A.2d at 301-02. The court stated:
The standard is "dangerous to self or society." Dangerous conduct is not
identical with criminal conduct. Dangerous conduct involves not merely viola-
tion of social norms enforced by criminal sanctions, but significant physical
or psychological injury to persons or substantial destruction of property.
Persons are not to be indefinitely incarcerated because they present a risk
of future conduct which is merely socially undesirable. Personal liberty and
autonomy are of too great value to be sacrificed to protect society against
the possibility of future behavior which some may find odd, disagreeable,
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The object of the order is to impose that degree of restraint upon
defendant necessary to reduce the risk of danger which he poses to
an acceptable level. Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting
the public, but the court should not, by its order, infringe upon defen-
dant's liberty or autonomy any more than appears reasonably necessary
to accomplish this goal.'
In State v. Fields the court ruled that NGRI acquittees have a right to
periodic review of their commitments,"0 stressing the care with which trial
courts should treat such cases:
If at any periodic review proceeding the State is unable to meet its
burden of justifying the continuance of the currently prevailing
restraints upon the liberty of the committee, it becomes the task of
the reviewing judge again to "mold" an appropriate order. . . The
new order should provide for the least restrictive restraints which
are found by the judge to be consistent with the well-being of the
community and the individual.... However, even where the commit-
tee's condition shows marked improvement, onlythe most extraordinary
or offensive, or even against the possibility of future non-dangerous acts
which would be ground for criminal prosecution if actually committed. Unlike
inanimate objects, people cannot be suppressed simply because they may
become public nuisances ....
Commitment requires that there be a substantial risk of dangerous
conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future. Evaluation of the magnitude
of the risk involves consideration both of the likelihood of dangerous conduct
and the seriousness of the harm which may ensue if such conduct takes
place . . . . It is not sufficient that the State establish a possibility that
defendant might commit some dangerous acts at some time in the indefinite
future. The risk of danger, a product of the likelihood of such conduct
and the degree of harm which may ensue, must be substantial within the
reasonably foreseeable future. On the other hand, certainty of prediction
is not required and cannot reasonably be expected.
A defendant may be dangerous in only certain types of situations
or in connection with relationships with certain individuals. An evaluation
of dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that
defendant will be exposed to such situations or come into contact with such
individuals. ...
Determination of dangerousness involves prediction of defendant's
future conduct rather than mere characterization of his past conduct.
Nonetheless, defendant's past conduct is important evidence as to his prob-
able future conduct. It is appropriate for the court to give substantial weight
to the nature and seriousness of the crime committed by defendant and its
relationship to his present mental condition.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
9. Id. at 261-62, 344 A.2d at 303.
10. 77 N.J. at 293, 390 A.2d at 579.
11. Id. at 302-03, 390 A.2d at 584.
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case would justify modification in any manner other than by a gradual
de-escalation of the restraints upon the committee's liberty.1"
The court in Fields believed that a process of gradually reducing restraint
would permit more thorough observation of the committee's ability to cope
with normal life.' 2 It would increase the probability that an erroneous deter-
mination of nondangerousness would be detected before the committee is
returned to an uncontrolled environment and preserve the "State's compelling
interest in maintaining the safety and security of its citizens."' 3
Carter established the standards governing conditional release of criminal
committees. Release is permitted only if the likelihood of dangerous behavior
has been reduced at least to the point at which future "psychotic episodes"
can be predicted and forestalled."' To facilitate speedy recall of the patient
should problems arise jeopardizing his safety or that of the public, the trial
court is required to maintain frequent contact with the patient and supervising
psychiatrist throughout the period of conditional release.'"
Cases such a Krol, Fields and Carter have created a coherent and practical
framework to insure that patients do not "slip through the cracks" at the
interface of the criminal justice and mental health systems. As will be dis-
cussed later, New Jersey's record under Krol and Fields is an excellent one:
it is a system that can and does work.' 6
The success of the New Jersey approach has been noted by leading experts
in the field. Recently, the former President of the American Academy of
Psychiatry and Law, testifying at a hearing on parallel federal legislative pro-
posals, noted the sophistication of the New Jersey insanity disposition system 7
and urged Congress to adopt a similar apparatus for federal jurisdictions.
The New Jersey experience is especially significant at the present time,
when so much of the debate on all sides is based on untested assumptions,
predictions, and competing social theories. New Jersey, through the auspices
of the Department of the Public Advocate, has brought to the legislative
battleground what few others in the country have been able to amass:'I hard
data based on seven years of experience with Krol hearings and four years
of experience with Fields hearings. These statistics reveal the extent to which
this issue has been distorted in the public eye.
12. Id. at 303, 390 A.2d at 584.
13. Id.
14. 64 N.J. at 400, 316 A.2d at 459.
15. Id. at 408, 316 A.2d at 463.
16. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
17. Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 2669, S. 2672, S. 2678, S. 2745,
and S. 2780 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 460, 462
(1982) (statement of Robert L. Sadoff, M.D.).
18. See, e.g., Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in New York
State, 1965-1976, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 186 (1979).
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It has frequently been suggested that the insanity defense is improperly
overused,' 9 an ancient allegation which resurfaced some seven years ago in
former President Nixon's unsupported charges that the defense has been sub-
ject to "unconscionable abuse by defendants." ' 0 All empirical analyses,
however, have been consistent: the public,I' legal profession,I and-specifically
-legislators, 2 3 "dramatically" 2 ' and "grossly" 25 overestimate both the fre-
quency and the success rate of the insanity plea. This error undoubtedly is
abetted by the media's "bizarre depictions,"'" "distortion[s], "" and "inac-
cu[racies]," 2' in presenting information on mentally ill persons charged with
crime. Of the more than 32,500 adult cases handled by the Office of the
Public Defender in New Jersey in fiscal year 1982, NGRI pleas were entered
only in fifty cases, less than one-sixth of one percent of all cases.29 Of those
fifty cases, the plea was successful only in fifteen cases." That figure represents
30% of all cases in which it was raised, and, most importantly, about one-
twentieth of one percent of all cases handled in the course of a year. To
suggest that such a percentage bespeaks "overuse" strains the imagination. 3 '
Furthermore, the decision to raise the insanity defense is not without
risks. A comparison of available figures demonstrates quite vividly that defen-
dants who asserted an insanity defense at trial, and who were ultimately found
guilty of their charges, served significantly longer sentences than defendants
19. See, e.g., M. KAVANAGH, THE CRImNAL AND His ALLIES 90 (1928) (charging
that, because "skillful criminal lawyers" can turn insanity defense trials into "emo-
tional disputes .... in cases where insanity is presented as a defense, so many verdicts
which outrage justice are returned").
20. MacKenzie, New Code Would Alter Rules on Insanity, Wash. Post, Oct.
12, 1975, at C6, col. 1.
21. Pasewark, Pantie & Steadman, supra note 18, at 186.
22. Pasewark & Craig, Insanity Plea: Defense Attorneys' Views, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 413, 415, 436-40 (1980).
23. Pasewark & Pantle, Insanity Plea: Legislators' View, 136 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY
222, 222-23 (1979) (in response to a survey, one state's legislators estimated that 4,400
defendants pleaded insanity and that 1,800 were found NGRI in a sample time period;
in reality, 102 defendants asserted the defense and only one was successful).
24. Pasewark, Pantie & Steadman, supra note 18, at 186.
25. Pasewark & Pantie, supra note 23, at 223.
26. Steadman & Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions
of the Criminally Insane, 41 PuB. OPINION Q. 523, 532 (1977-1978). See, e.g., Kauf-
man, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
27. Steadman & Cocozza, supra note 26, at 523.
28. Id. at 532.
29. See Appendix, Table IV, Col. 1 (excluding cases open pending competence).
30. See id., Table IV.
31. These figures are consistent with a 1978 national study which found that,
out of more than 2 million criminal prosecutions, only 1,625 involved the successful
use of the insanity plea (less than one-tenth of one percent). Lauter, Why the Insanity
Defense is Breaking Down, NAT'L L.J., May 3, 1982, at 1, 11.
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tried on the same charges without asserting the insanity defense. 2
Another common misconception is that the insanity defense is raised only
in murder cases. 3 In reality, only four of the fifteen NGRI findings last
year (26.6%) stemmed from cases involving a death. 3 ' Moreover, examination
of all the files ever opened by the Division of Mental Health Advocacy on
persons committed following NGRI findings-a total of 141 in more than
eight years (less than 1.807o of all Division of Mental Health Advocacy
cases) 3 -revealed that in less than one-third of all cases (46 of 141) involved
deaths.36 Interestingly, among these 141 cases were cases involving charges
of nonviolent offenses such as writing false checks, carrying an unloaded
starter's pistol, and drug use. 7 In any event, the reality does not comport
with the myth.
It is also assumed that persons found NGRI are released from custody
or court restraint after having served little or no time, an assumption dis-
proved by the facts. All persons found NGRI are subject to judicial oversight
32.
Total Mean Sentences: Total Mean Sentences:
No Insanity Defense Insanity Defense
Prison Sentences For: Pleaded Pleaded; Guilty Verdict
Serious offenses against
persons 165.5 months 372 months
Atrocious assault 55 months 120 months
Robbery 70 months 204 months
Crimes against property 40 months 35 months
NEW JERSEY CORRECTIONAL MASTER PLAN POLICY COUNCIL, 2 NEW JERSEY
CORRECTIONAL PLAN 33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as N.J. CORRECTIONAL PLAN]. When
the comparison is limited to murder cases, the results are equally striking. A randomly
selected sample of 39 homicide cases showed a mean maximum sentence of 21.6 years
for defendants who did not plead NGRI; defendants who pleaded NGRI and were
ultimately convicted received mean maximum sentences of 42.4 years-practically dou-
ble the sentence imposed on the former class of murder defendants.
33. See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 87, 152 A.2d 50, 77 (1959) (Weintraub,
C.J., concurring).
Persons charged with murder are no more successful in securing an acquittal
by reason of insanity than are persons charged with other crimes. STEADMAN, KEITNER,
BRAFF & ARrvANTEs, FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH A SUCCESSFUi INSANITY PLEA, 4-5 (1981).
34. See Appendix, Table V.
35. As of January 1, 1982, the Division of Mental Health Advocacy had opened
26,550 cases.
36. Appendix, Table I. Cases involving deaths include not only murders but
also manslaughter and death by automobile. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-1 to -6
(West 1982).
37. Of the 141 open files, there are 46 death cases, 57 other assaults, II arsons,
12 thefts, and 15 others. See Appendix, Table I.
For an earlier survey, see Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the Seventies: Observations
and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 407 n.9
(1977-1978).
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prior to any release from confinement." Persons found NGRI of violent
crimes are confined to the Vroom Building (Forensic Unit) of Trenton
Psychiatric Hospital3 for some period of time during the pendency of their
criminal charges. A person found NGRI cannot be released from this facility
until a court determines that his release will pose no danger to himself or
the community."'
Of the 138 Krol committees still living, only 22 (just 1507o) have been
released from all restraints.4 ' Significantly, only one case in this group stemmed
from a wrongful death. 2 In fact, 35% of the committees (50 of 141) are
still in full custody, and 4707o of them (66 of 141) are still under partial
court restraints following conditional release.4 3 Such results indicate the
seriousness with which trial courts take the supreme court's admonition that
"only the most extraordinary case would justify modification in any manner
other than by a gradual de-escalation of the restraints upon the [patient's]
liberty."
4 4
One of the most significant effects of this commitment system for NGRI
defendants is that they spend considerably more time in custody than do
other criminal defendants. On the average, Krol defendants spent more than
40 months in such a setting;" almost double the mean of 20.5 months that
38. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
39. A law was recently enacted establishing the Vroom Building as a separate
facility known as the Forensic Psychiatric Hospital. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:1-7 (West
Supp. 1983). Vroom Building is a maximum security facility in which patients are
confined on locked, guarded wards. Patients seldom leave the building and, even
then, are heavily guarded. Conditions at the institution have been described as not
only severely restrictive of movement but also unhealthy and dangerous. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit described the conditions as follows:
The jury found, and the court agreed, that confining Scott in the maximum
security wing of Trenton Psychiatric Hospital amounted to punishment in
violation of the due process clause. There was ample evidence that Scott
and the other inmates were exposed for twenty four years to subhuman living
conditions, including poor plumbing with leaking pipes covering the floor
with inches of water; inoperative sinks and toilets; inadequate ventilation;
absence of windows or inoperative windows; inability during seven months
of the year to go into the yard for fresh air; inoperative radiators resulting
in indoor temperatures below 500; summer temperatures reading 1050 due
to absence of ventilating equipment; for a time availability of showers only
once a week; and absence of hot running water in sinks in the cells. As
to many of these gross physical deficiencies the testimony was not even disputed.
Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
3474 (1982).
40. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(b) (West 1982).
41. See Appendix, Table I.
42. Id.
43. Id. For a description of the conditional release process, see Fields, 77 N.J.
at 302-03, 390 A.2d at 584; Carter, 64 N.J. at 392-95, 316 A.2d at 455-57.
44. Fields, 77 N.J. at 303, 390 A.2d at 584.
45. See Appendix.
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convicted criminal defendants spend in prison settings." Moreover, since a
Krol patient cannot be released unless he is found not to be dangerous, he
may be subject to a lifetime of judicial oversight, far in excess of that experienced
by a criminal offender. Again, there is a huge gap between myth and reality.
7
It is also commonly assumed that many criminal defendants who plead
insanity are faking and are able to persuade unwitting courts that they are
mentally ill when they are not, in fact, impaired. This is hardly a new thought:
in 1838, Dr. Isaac Ray, the father of American forensic psychiatry, noted that
[t]he supposed insurmountable difficulty of distinguishing between
feigned and real insanity has conduced, probably more than all other
causes together, to bind the legal profession to the most rigid con-
struction and application of the common law relative to this disease,
and is always put forward in objection to the more humane doctrines."8
Almost 150 years later, Dr. Ray's observations are still sadly on point; again,
though, the popular perception is simply incorrect. Of the 141 Krol patients,
115 were diagnosed as schizophrenic (including 38 of the 46 cases involving
a death), eleven as suffering from organic brain syndrome, five as mentally
retarded, and three as paranoid. One patient was determined to have an alcoholic
psychosis, one suffered from depressive neurosis, and one was characterized
as an "anti-social personality." In only three cases out of 141 was the diagnosti-
cian unwilling to specify the nature of the patient's mental illness. Thus, in
138 cases the examining psychiatrist certified that the defendant suffered from
some form of mental illness.4 9 Again, the statistics belie the myths."
II. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NGRI DEFENSE
Both the New Jersey Legislature and the United States Congress recently
undertook an extensive examination and debate of strikingly similar packages
of bills aimed at abolishing or limiting the insanity defense, creating an alter-
native verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and restricting disposition procedures
available to individuals found NGRI.5 ' Yet, each of these bills was premised
on all or part of the misconceptions as to the use of the insanity defense
discussed in Part I of this Article.
46. See generally N.J. CORRECTIONAL PLAN, supra note 32.
47. These statistics are even more revealing when it is considered that a signifi-
cant percentage of convicted defendants are never incarcerated at all. The gap between
Krol-time and prison-time is thus even greater than it appears.
48. I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 247,
at 243 (1962).
49. See Appendix, Table II.
50. But see infra notes 152-73 and accompanying text. In considering the per-
suasiveness of this evidence it may be worthwhile to consider whether the ability to
categorize mental illness is equivalent to the ability to predict inherent dangerousness
of defendants.
51. It should be noted that few of these pro'posed bills are new in concept.
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A. Abolition Bills
The abolition bills introduced before the United States House of Represen-
tatives Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice closely parallel
bills earlier debated before the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee. 2
Several bills propose abolition of the insanity defense during a trial on guilt
or innocence; others would permit evidence of mental illness/insanity to be
Several-including some of the abolition attempts-were enacted temporarily 50 and
60 years ago in other states; each was quickly found to be unconstitutional. See,
e.g., State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 996, 123 So. 639, 642 (1929); Sinclair v. State,
161 Miss. 142, 153, 132 So. 581, 582 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110
P. 1020, 1025 (1910). In recent months, abolition statutes have been enacted in Idaho
and Montana. See IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1982); 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 713. Neither
statute has yet been tested in the courts.
52. Compare S. 2745, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982):
§ 16(a) Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct.
(b) Nothing in this section is intended to prevent the admission of expert
evidence on the issues of mens rea or any state of mind which is an element
of the offense, subject to the rules of evidence. (emphasis added),
and H.R. 6673, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982):
§ 16(a) Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal con-
duct.
(b) Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence
on the state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the rules
of evidence. (emphasis added),
with N.J. Senate Bill 1495 (1982):
1. a. Mental disease or defect is not a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct.
b. Expert evidence may be admitted, however, on the issues of mens rea
or any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the Rules
of Evidence. (emphasis added),
and N.J. Senate Bill 1587 (1982):
1. a. Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal
conduct.
b. Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence
on the issues of mens rea or any state of mind which is an element of the
offense, subject to the Rules of Evidence. (emphasis added).
Compare also S. 818, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982):
§ 16(a) It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute, that
the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind
required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect does
not otherwise constitute a defense. (emphasis added),
and S. 1558, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982):
§ 17(b) If the issue of insanity is raised .... the jury shall be instructed to
find, or, in the event of a nonjury trial, the court shall find, the defendant-
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or
(3) not guilty only by reason of insanity.
(emphasis added),
and H.R. 6718, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982):
§ 4242(c) If the issue of insanity is raised .... the jury shall be instructed
1983]
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offered at sentencing." All raise serious constitutional and practical questions.
The bills would deprive a criminal defendant of the opportunity to offer
evidence going to the heart of his susceptibility to punishment, i.e., his criminal
intent. It is elementary law that conduct is punishable when a person commits
a prohibited act and does so with "criminal intent" (mens rea or a guilty
mind).5 4 Consideration of criminal intent is based on the assumption that
the person has the capacity to choose between right and wrong; that he has
a sense of wrongdoing." For these reasons, we must be extremely careful
in" tampering with the basic roots of the insanity defense, a major component
of the Anglo-American common law for over 700 years.'
to find, or, in the event of a nonjury trial, the court shall find the defendant-
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or
(3) guilty but insane.
(emphasis added),
with N.J. Senate Bill 1631 (1982):
1. (New Section) a. It shall be an affirmative defense to a criminal prosecution
that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state
of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect
does not otherwise constitute a defense.
b. If the issue of mental disease or defect is raised .... the jury shall be
instructed to find, or, in the event of a trial without a jury, the court shall
find, the defendant either:
(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or
(3) not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.
(emphasis added).
And finally, compare H.R. 6921, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (abolishing the insanity
defense for specific offenses such as assassination and attempted assassination of a Presi-
dent) with N.J. Senate Bill 1359 (1982) (providing in part: "the affirmative defense
of insanity shall not be available to a person who has been charged with the crime of
murder under N.J.S. 2C:11-3 [notwithstanding any other law to the contrary]").
53. See id.
54. See In Defense of the Insane, supra note 3, at 130. See also Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954), in which Judge Bazelon stated
"[olur collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."
(quoting Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 852 (1948)).
55. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The concept
of 'belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil' is a core concept that is 'universal
and persistent in mature systems of law.' ") (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)). See also Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense? - Not
Yet, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 719, 725 (1973).
56. The insanity defense has been in existence since at least the twelfth century.
But what shall we say of a madman bereft of reason? And of the deranged,
the delirious and the mentally retarded? or if one labouring under a high
fever drowns himself or kills himself? Quaere whether such a one commits
felony de se. It-is submitted that he does not, nor do such persons forfeit
their inheritance or their chattels, since they are without sense and reason
and can no more commit an injuria or a felony than a brute animal since
[Vol. 14:397
LEGISLATIVE ASSA UL TS
New Jersey's experience is particularly illustrative on this point. The in-
sanity defense has been a part of the law of the State since its first constitution
incorporated English common law.II The defense has been based upon a defen-
they are not far removed from brutes, as is evident in the case of a minor,
for if he should kill another while under age he would not suffer judgment.
[That a madman is not liable is true, unless he acts under pretence of madness
while enjoying lucid intervals.]
2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUs ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE 424 (S. Thorne Trans. 1968).
[B]ecause a crime is not committed unless the intention to injure exists, [it
is will and purpose which mark maleficia, nor is a theft committed unless
there is an intent to steal,] as may be said of a child or a madman, since
the absence of intention protects the one and the unkindness of fate excuses
the other.
Id. at 384.
Before Bracton, the sources of the insanity defense at common law can be traced
at least to the Roman legal authorities that influenced Bracton. See generally T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 261-62 (5th ed. 1956). For
example, in the Digests (or Pandects) of Justinian first published in A.D. 533, the
following commentary on the insanity defense appears in an imperial "rescript" issued
by the brother emperors Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 120-180) and Commodus (A.D. 161-192)
during the period of their joint reign (A.D. 177-180):
If it is positively ascertained by you that Aelius Perscus is to such a degree
insane that, through his constant alienation of mind, he is void of all understan-
ding, and no suspicion exists that he was pretending insanity when he killed
his mother, you can disregard the manner of his punishment, since he has
already been sufficiently punished by his insanity; still, he should be placed
under careful restraint, and, if you think proper, even be placed in chains;
as this has reference not so much to his punishment as to his own protection
and the safety of his neighbors. If, however, as often happens, he has intervals
of sounder mind, you must diligently inquire whether he did not commit
the crime during one of these periods, so that no indulgence should be given
to his affliction; and, if you find that this is the case, notify Us, that We
may determine whether he should be punished in proportion to the enormity
of his offence, if he committed it at a time when he seemed to know what
he was doing.
2 THE Civn. LAW 259 (S. Scott ed. 1973). For another translation, see A. BIRLEY,
MARcus AURELIUS 272-73 (1966).
The maxim derived from this Roman commentary-furiosus solo furore punitur
(a madman is punished by his madness alone)-appears in numerous English cases
and treatises on the insanity defense. See, e.g., H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL
MAxIms 5 (London 1845); E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, OR A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 247b (17th ed. 1817).
The development of the insanity defense between the eras of Bracton and Blackstone,
infra note 58, is well documented. See E. COKE, supra; 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29-37 (London 1736); W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1-3 (London 1739). For an extensive history of this develop-
ment, see J. BIOGS, THE GUILTY MIND 47-56, 81-88, (1955).
Note further Professor Monahan's comment that abolition of the insanity defense
would "cut loose the criminal law from its moorings of condemnation for moral
failure." Monahan, supra note 55, at 731 (quoting Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues
of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789, 797 (1967)).
57. See State v. Mairs, 1 N.J.L. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1795). See also N.J. CONST.
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dant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong," rather than upon an absence
of mens rea." The historical, common law principle was codified in a still-
extant statute which provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of
such conduct he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what
he was doing was wrong. Insanity is an affirmative defense which
must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."
art. 22 (1776), modified, N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (1844); N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
The common law at the time was described by Blackstone:
Now there are three cases, in which the will does not join with the act:
1. Where there is a defect of understanding. For where there is no discern-
ment, there is no choice; and where there is no choice, there can be no
act of the will, which is nothing else but a determination of one's choice,
to do or to abstain from a particular action: he therefore, that has no understan-
ding, can have no will to guide his conduct.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 21.
58. In the first reported case in New Jersey involving the defense of insanity,
the court recognized the common law principles involved and instructed the jury as
follows:
[I]f it is your opinion that at the time of committing the act he was un-
conscious that he ought not to do it, or in other words, incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong, in a moral point of view, then you have
nothing further to do, but to render a verdict of acquittal on the score of
insanity.
State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 201 (1846) (opinion of Hornblower, C.J.) (emphasis
in original).
59. It is well to begin with the law's concept of criminal responsibility.
The common law spoke of the bad and of the sick. The premise was that
a hostile act may in one case spring from wickedness and in another from
some infirmity of the mind which the individual did not author. It was the
moral judgment of the common law that a forbidden act should not be
punished criminally unless done with mens rea, a sense of wrongdoing. The
M'Naghten test of legal insanity followed hard upon that conception of crime.
If at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such
a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know
what he was doing was wrong, he was legally insane. . . . Thus afflicted,
the accused did not have the evil mind required by the common law's concept
of criminal accountability. The act was therefore chargeable to illness.
State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 212, 287 A.2d 715, 720 (1972) (citations omitted).
Thus, it was natural, although analytically incorrect, for writers and judges
developing such defenses as infancy, insanity or compulsion, to rationalize
them on the absence of mens rea, rather than, more appropriately, upon
mental incapacity for voluntary action. In other words, it was not that the
defendant's mind was not evil, but rather that he had no mind that was
free to will.
State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 456, 341 A.2d 598, 608 (1975) (citations omitted).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1982).
[Vol. 14:397
LEGISLATIVE ASSA UL TS
Although the United State Supreme Court "has never articulated a general
constitutional doctrine of mens rea,"' it has stated that the "existence of
a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." 62 As the court pointed out in
Morissette v. United States,63 the use of the phrase " 'mens rea' to signify
an evil purpose or mental culpability . . . [seeks] to protect those who were
not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common law crimes." 64
To have such "evil purpose" or "criminal intent," an act must be done
"knowingly," a term defined as "voluntarily and purposely," 6 or "voluntari-
ly and intentionally."" In addition to guilty knowledge, mens rea implies
willfulness; 67 willfulness means "a voluntary intentional violation of a known
legal duty."6 Although "knowingly" and "willfully" are different elements
of mens rea, each must be proved to sustain a criminal prosecution.
6 9
Insofar as the abolition bills would limit a defendant's ability to prove
that he was incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act and its
consequences,7" they would thereby deprive the defendant of his due process
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.7 ' Thus, a defendant cannot
be deprived of all ability to offer evidence on the issue of his criminal intent.
2
61. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
62. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951). See also American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, in which the Court noted:
While it is true that state of mind is ordinarily relevant only when it is inciden-
tal to, and determines the quality of, some overt act, . . . the fact must
not be overlooked that mental state in such cases is a distinct issue, ...
of which the "overt act" may or may not be any proof. For example, the
physical facts surrounding a death by shooting may be as consistent with
a finding of accident as of murder. Wilfullness, malice and premeditation
must therefore be proved by evidence wholly apart from the act of shooting.
339 U.S. 382, 411 n.21 (1950) (citations omitted).
63. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
64. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
65. United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 572 n.l (2d Cir. 1965). See also United
States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941).
66. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
951 (1976); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d 1289, 1294 n.3 (8th Cir. 1969).
67. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437, 438 (3d Cir. 1943).
68. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976).
69. United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
Record Revolution No. 6 v. City of Parma, 492 F. Supp. 1157, 1175 n.10 (N.D.
Ohio), rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1980).
70. One commentator described the results of enacting similar legislation as
follows: "Accidental (non-negligent) criminal conduct and the delusional mistake of
fact will continue to excuse whereas the offender who accurately perceives what he
is doing but is powerless to exercise moral judgment will suffer conviction, imprison-
ment and involuntary medical treatment." Wales, supra note 2, at 698.
71. U.S. CoNsT. amends. VI, XIV. See also N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
72. See supra note 51.
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The government may alter the procedure by which the issue of insanity is
presented, but it may not eliminate the issue altogether. 73
The ramifications of the enactment of abolition bills are uncertain. Such
laws are not likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, even assum-
ing that action is not immediately forthcoming from the judicial branch, courts
may take other steps to preserve the concept of criminal intent, causing results
not intended by the legislative branch. For example, evidence of mental illness
is considered generally relevant to the issue of mens rea. 74 Courts would be
obliged to determine the relevance of evidence offered. The insanity defense
could be retained as a rule of evidence rather than as a rule of substantive
law, and be used to determine at what point evidence of mental illness as
it pertains to a defendant's mens rea becomes relevant.7
Few defendants fit within the standard imposed by the current insanity
defense. The New Jersey Supreme Court has jealously protected against an
expansion of the defense beyond those not able to exercise free will in a
situation.76 For those who fit within the standard, the defense forms an impor-
tant component of our criminal justice system. As Chief Judge Hornblower
stated in the first reported case involving the defense in New Jersey:
God and humanity forbid it should ever be, that courts should frown
upon insanity as a defence, or that if a jury are satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the act complained of was committed when
the accused was insane, they should for one moment hesitate in pro-
nouncing a verdict of acquittal."
B. "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Bills
Both the New Jersey Legislature and the United States Congress enter-
73. Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 512, 518, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1933).
74. Monahan, supra note 55, at 727.
75. Id. at 728. Courts could use the expansion of relevance to avoid the constitu-
tional problems raised by the proposals. See Wales, supra note 2, at 709.
76. In State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965), for example, the
defendant sought to assert the insanity defense on the grounds of psychodynamics,
i.e., a psychiatric theory that all conduct is a result of one's life history. In rejecting
the argument Justice Francis noted:
For protection of society the law accepts the thesis that all men are invested
with free will and capable of choosing between right and wrong. In the present
state of scientific knowledge that thesis cannot be put aside in the administra-
tion of the criminal law. Criminal blameworthiness cannot be judged on
a basis that negates free will and excuses the offense, wholly or partially,
on opinion evidence that the offender's psychological processes or mechanisms
were such that even though he knew right from wrong he was predetermined
to act the way he did at that time because of unconscious influences set
in motion by the emotional stresses then confronting him.
Id. at 470, 210 A.2d at 202.
77. State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 206 (1846) (opinion of Hornblower, C.J.).
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tained bills which proposed the creation of an alternative verdict of "guilty
but mentally ill" (GBMI) or "guilty but insane" (GBI)" in cases in which
a defendant asserts the insanity defense. These bills appear to propose such
alternative verdicts in lieu of, rather than in addition to, the verdict of "not
guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI). Presumably, this device is intended
to allow the factfinder - whether judge or jury - to avoid a finding of
NGRI and arrive at a verdict which imposes culpability while simultaneously
acknowledging the existence of mental disease or defect.
There are several major problems with these bills. The GBMI verdict 0
is not only superfluous, it is dangerous as well. GBMI is indistinguishable
from the traditional guilty verdict which is based on a finding that the accused
is criminally responsible for his actions. If the prosecutor has proven every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is guilty.
In a case where insanity is pleaded, the only inquiry remaining for the fact-
finder at this point is whether that guilt is negated by the defendant's evidence
of insanity. If that question is answered affirmatively, the verdict is "not
guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI). If it is answered in the negative, the
verdict remains "guilty."
The factfinder's addition of "but mentally ill" or "but insane" onto
its initial guilty verdict does not constitute a legitimate factfinding function.
This is especially true in as much as, under the proposed legislation, the
consequences flowing from a GBMI verdict relate strictly to disposition and
not to the threshold question of criminal responsibility.
One group of bills provides that a defendant found GBMI shall be given
any sentence which can be imposed upon conviction of the particular offense,
with the proviso that "treatment" shall be made available to him. 1 Another
group provides for the imposition of a "provisional sentence" to be served
either immediately, if no hospitalization due to mental illness is required,
or following such hospitalization.8 " A sub-group of this latter set provide
78. See, e.g., N. J. Assembly Bill 290 (1982); and federal bills: S. 2672, H.R.
6947, H.R. 6887, H.R. 6717, H.R. 6702, H.R. 6673, and H.R. 6653, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982).
79. See, e.g., S. 1106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); H.R. 6949, H.R. 6742,
H.R. 6726, H.R. 6718, H.R. 6716, H.R. 6709, and H.R. 5395, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
80. For purposes of discussion in this section, these bills will be referred to,
collectively, as GBMI, rather than GBI, proposals; the latter will be deemed included
in the former. It should be pointed out, however, that the "guilty but insane" alter-
native verdict is even more fraught with confusion and inconsistency than GBMI.
In fact, under current standards of culpability and mens rea, the GBI verdict is a
legal impossibility because insanity-so long as it continues to exist as a defense to
criminal conduct-is an absolute exception to culpability, and hence to guilt. In other
words, the two legal statuses denoted by those terms are mutually exclusive.
81. See N.J. Assembly Bill 290 (1982); S. 2672, H.R. 6887, H.R. 6717, and H.R.
6702, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
82. See H.R. 6949, H.R. 6716, and H.R. 6709, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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specifically for a pre-confinement hearing to determine whether the defendant
is presently suffering from mental disease or defect.83
The first group of GBMI bills, which includes the New Jersey bill, replicate
current pre-sentence and sentencing procedures in both the New Jersey and
federal court systems. For example, New Jersey court rules8 ' set forth an
elaborate and comprehensive pre-sentence procedure which is paralleled in
state statutory law.85 New Jersey already requires a pre-sentence investigation
and report to the court. The report "shall contain all presentence material
having any bearing whatever on the sentence" 86 and "may include a report
on [the defendant's] physical and mental condition and any other matters
that the probation officer deems relevant or the court directs to be included." 87
After completion of the pre-sentence investigation, the court "may order that
the defendant's physical or mental condition be examined, provided that the
defendant is not institutionalized for the purpose of the examination." 8
New Jersey court rules also require that, at sentencing, the judge state
his reasons for imposing the sentence.89 The statement must be specific enough
to demonstrate how the judge weighed all the relevant factors, including gravity
of the offense, deterrence, rehabilitation of the defendant and "other par-
ticularly pertinent considerations." 9
The federal rules of criminal procedure provide for pre-sentence pro-
ceedings similar in scope and purpose to those in New Jersey. 9' A pre-sentence
investigation and report is mandatory unless it is waived by the defendant,
or the court "finds that there is in the record information sufficient to enable
the meaningful exercise of sentencing discretion .... "I The report must contain
such information about [the defendant's] characteristics, his financial
condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be
83. See S. 1106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982); H.R. 6742, H.R. 6726, and H.R.
5395, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
84. See N.J. CT. R. 3:21-2.
85. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-b (West 1982).
86. N.J. CT. R. 3:21-2(a).
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6b (West 1982) (emphasis added).
88. N.J. CT. R. 3:21-2(b). Furthermore, defendants convicted of one of the
sexual offenses enumerated in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-1 (West 1982) shall "be refer-
red to the Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center for such period as shall be necessary
to complete a physical and psychological examination." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-1
(West 1982). If the examination reveals the defendant's conduct to be "characterized
by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior," the court may sentence the defendant
to the Center "for a program of specialized treatment for his mental condition."
Id. § 2C:47-3. Upon commitment of a defendant to the Center, "[tihe Commissioner
of the Department of Corrections ...shall provide for his treatment in the .. .
Center." Id. § 2C:47-4.
89. See N.J. CT. R. 3:21-4(e).
90. S. PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, 3:21-4 comment 6.
91. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
92. FED. R. CalM. P. 32(c)(1).
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helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correc-
tional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as
may be required by the court."
In short, existing pre-sentence procedures under the New Jersey and federal
court rules are designed to accomplish the very purpose intended by the GBMI
bills, namely the identification of those defendants for whom some form
of psychiatric or psychological therapy is indicated based on their past history
and current condition.9 '
The "provisional sentence" group of GBMI bills also relate solely to
disposition, an area which, as noted earlier, does not constitute a legitimate
factfinding function. The additional procedural aspects of the "provisional
sentence" bills do not cure the basic defect of these bills - that is, the unwar-
ranted creation of a completely superfluous and meaningless verdict which,
in its ramifications, goes far beyond the legitimate factual inquiry into in-
nocence or guilt.
Furthermore, these GBMI bills would inevitably cause significant jury
confusion, as juries would be required to receive additional instructions -
and undertake further deliberations - to distinguish insanity and mental disease
or defect not amounting to legal insanity yet sufficient to warrant a GBMI
finding.
In New Jersey, for example,"' when a defendant pleads insanity, the jury
is instructed that the defendant is presumed sane and that he bears the burden
of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 Under a GBMI
statute, the jury would be further instructed concerning the GBMI verdict
which, they would be told, requires them to find defendant guilty and mentally
ill or retarded, but not legally insane - all beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury is already faced with weighing two different quantums of proof: the
defendant's "preponderance of the evidence" standard versus the state's
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Requiring the jury to distinguish
93. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (emphasis added).
94. A GBMI verdict relates to a defendant's mental condition at the time of
the offense, not at the time of sentencing. Thus, existing pre-sentence procedures
are superior to the GBMI verdict in view of the objective to be accomplished-proper
disposition of the defendant with regard to his current mental status. Similarly, the
"but mentally ill" tag is particularly meaningless in terms of a defendant's condition
at the time of disposition.
95. N.J. Assembly Bill 290 was defeated in the New Jersey Senate Judiciary
Committee on August 5, 1982. Consequently, the following textual discussion of the
impact of the GBMI concept on New Jersey criminal procedure is hypothetical. The
authors believe, however, that the discussion is illustrative of the particular type of
jury confusion which could be wrought, were a GBMI bill to be enacted into law
in New Jersey.
96. State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288, 293, 315 A.2d 385, 388 (1974). See also
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1982).
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between mental illness (or retardation) 97 and insanity,9 S increases the potential
for jury confusion.
To further muddy the waters New Jersey law provides that evidence of
a defendant's mental disease or defect "is admissible whenever it is relevant
to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element
of the offense." 99 In other words, evidence of mental disease or defect may
negate the mens rea element of some offenses. The burden remains on the
prosecution, however, to establish the absence of such mental disease or defect
by proving the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. Were a GBMI
statute in effect, a jury would thus have to contend with legal insanity, mental
illness (or retardation), negation of the intent element, shifting and varying
burdens of proof, and guilt or innocence - all for the purpose of weighing
a GBMI alternative which serves no valid function independent of the tradi-
tional guilty verdict. GBMI creates no intermediate degrees of culpability,
it simply adds a "but mentally ill" to the guilty verdict. In short, the GBMI
verdict provides no assistance to the jury in resolving the issues of insanity,
mental illness and criminal accountability based on the trial evidence.
Some of these GBMI bills' 0 appear to be based in large part on a similar
Michigan law. The statute has been challenged in at least three cases brought
in Michigan state courts, but none of those cases directly addresses the con-
cerns we have expressed here. In People v. McLeod,'0 ' the defendant was
found GBMI of arson. After the verdict, but prior to disposition, the trial
court held hearings to determine what type of treatment might be provided
to the defendant under the Michigan GBMI statute. At the close of the hear-
ings, the trial court determined that the treatment mandated by the statute
would not be provided to the defendant.' 2 The Michigan Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the determination was based on an inadequate record,
and that the proceedings themselves were premature.' 3 The defendant also
challenged the probation provision of the statute, citing equal protection and
due process violations in the mandate that the period of probation be not
97. Mental illness is defined in New Jersey as "mental disease to such an extent
that a person so afflicted requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the
welfare of others, or of the community." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 (West 1981).
Mental retardation is defined as "a state of significant subnormal intellectual develop-
ment with reduction of social competence ... [which] is expected to be of life dura-
tion." Id.
98. An individual is legally insane "if at the time of such conduct he was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know
what he was doing was wrong." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1982).
99. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-2 (West 1982).
100. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
101. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
102. Id. at 648-49, 288 N.W.2d at 912-13.
103. Id. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915.
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less than five years.'0 4 The court found that the statute permitted a sentencing
judge to place a defendant on probation for less than five years and to provide
for periodic review of the continuing need for treatment. It deemed the five
year period "rebuttable." 0°
In People v. Fultz,' the defendant pleaded GBMI to joyriding. The
psychiatric evidence showed him to have been legally insane at the time of
the offense. The appeals court found the plea to be invalid because it was
unsupported by an appropriate factual basis.' 07 Consequently, the defendant's
GBMI plea was vacated.
Finally, in People v. Sorna, "I the defendant attacked the constitutionality
of the statute. The appeals court disposed of the defendant's equal protection
claim, finding no constitutional violation. The court regarded GBMI as "an
intermediate category to deal with situations where a defendant's mental illness
does not deprive him of substantial capacity sufficient to satisfy the insanity
test but does warrant treatment in addition to incarceration."' 0 9 The court
stated further: "[tihe fact that these distinctions may not appear clear-cut
does not warrant a finding of no rational basis to make them."" 0
I- As previously stated, none of these court challenges directly touches upon
the substantial issues raised by the GBMI concept. Moreover, notwithstanding
the Soma opinion on equal protection, nothing prevents a federal court from
finding such a violation in any one of the bills discussed here, under different
circumstances.
It is important to note that a number of these GBMI bills are, in effect,
abolition bills. They create the GBMI plea and verdict by amending Rule 12.2
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, eliminating all references in that
Rule to procedures governing the insanity defense. ' This tactic virtually repeals
the insanity defense by a mechanism as direct as the one used in the abolition
bills discussed earlier.
Finally, the GBMI concept gives merely the illusion of compassionate
treatment. To the extent that it has been documented, people convicted under
that verdict are sentenced in the same manner as defendants who are found
guilty. Thus, the jury's verdict of GBMI does not always ensure treatment
for the defendant." 2
104. Id. at 655-56, 288 N.W.2d at 915-16.
105. Id. at 664, 288 N.W.2d at 919.
106. 111 Mich. App. 587, 314 N.W.2d 702 (1981).
107. Id. at 591, 314 N.W.2d at 704.
108. 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
109. Id. at 360, 276 N.W.2d at 896.
110. Id. See also People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1977)
(per curiam).
Ill. See, e.g., S. 1106, 97thCong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6949, H.R. 6726, H.R.
6716, H.R. 6709, and H.R. 5395, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
112. See Lauter, New Verdict: Guilty But Mentally Ill: The Legislative Alter-
native, Nat'l L.J., May 3, 1982, at 12, col. 3. The American Bar Association has
passed preliminary judgment on the GBMI verdict and has deemed it "misleading
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C. Disposition Bills
An area which was specifically addressed by one New Jersey bill," 3 and
which permeated several of the federal bills, was that of the post-verdict
disposition of defendant found NGRI, or-in the case of the federal
legislation-GBMI. I I4
The New Jersey bill proposed to amend pertinent sections of the state's
criminal code' I to provide that NGRI committees be committed for treatment
for a period of time at least equal to the minimum criminal sentence which
could have been imposed had the defendant been found guilty of the offense
charged. ' 16 A mandatory minimum period of commitment for treatment would
thus be established, based solely on the minimum criminal sentence for the
underlying charge. This proposal gave rise to substantial problems.
Perhaps the most significant problem is that no comparable fixed minimum
term of commitment exists for individuals who are civilly committed in New
Jersey.I" Thus, the bill would be in violation of constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection afforded to individuals subject to involun-
tary confinement, as established by the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and
of the United States.
In State v. Krol, the New Jersey Supreme Court spoke broadly of the
constitutional requirement of substantially identical treatment for all individuals
committed because of dangerousness resulting from mental illness-whether
such individuals were originally confined through the civil commitment pro-
cess or through the criminal courts." 8 This concept was confirmed and
significantly expanded in State v. Fields, where the supreme court concluded:
[T]he fact that a mentally ill person has committed an act which would
expose a mentally competent person to criminal sanction is a constitu-
tionally unacceptable justification for granting him less procedural and
substantive protection against involuntary commitment than that
generally afforded all other members of society .... [Krol] indicated
that the same criteria should be dispositive of the propriety of modify-
ing or terminating orders requiring institutionalization. . . at the re-
quest of the NGI committee or the State, as is the case where the release
of civil committees is at issue."'
and ill-conceived." Task Force on Nonresponsibility for Crime, ABA, Provisional
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, pt. IV, at 9 (Apr. 1982) (discussion paper:
not to be construed as the final official position of the ABA).
113. See N.J. Senate Bill 1427 (1982), which was also defeated in the New Jersey
Senate Judiciary Committee on August 5, 1982.
114. See, e.g., S. 1106, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6742, H.R. 6726, H.R.
5395, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
115. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:4-8, 2C:4-9 (1982).
116. N.J. Senate Bill 1427, § 1 (1982).
117. See N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7.
118. 68 N.J. 236, 250-51, 344 A.2d 289, 297 (1975).
119. 77 N.J. 282, 294, 390 A.2d 574, 580 (1978) (emphasis added).
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The court concluded, as a matter of constitutional imperative, that "the
significant safeguards afforded civil committees by virtue of the [requirement
of] periodic review. . . must be extended to NGI committees as well." 20 The
New Jersey bill thus violated the constitutional mandate of Fields by impos-
ing a minimum term of confinement and by setting that minimum term of con-
finement as a prerequisite to release under the provisions of state law.' 2 '
The bill's provisions also ran afoul of similar constitutional imperatives
articulated by the United States Supreme Court: "At the least, due process re-
quires that the nature and duration of the commitment bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'12 2 In O'Connor
v. Donaldson,'23 the Supreme Court was even more emphatic: "Nor is it enough
that [the individual's] original confinement was founded upon constitutionally
adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement
was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after that basis
no longer existed."' 2 4
In sum, New Jersey constitutional law requires identical treatment for NGRI
committees and civil committees. This treatment includes equal rights to periodic
review as provided by the New Jersey Court Rules.' 25 In each review hearing
the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the continuing need
for confinement of the individual due to his current mental illness and resulting
likelihood of dangerousness. 26 Insofar as the New Jersey bill purported to
establish a fixed minimum term of confinement, it was thus incompatible with
the flexibility and individual consideration constitutionally required by the State
in matters relating to confinement of NGRI defendants. 2 7
The federal disposition bills raise similar concerns. Some provisions give
the director of the facility to which the individual is committed sole discretion
to determine when that individual has recovered "to such an extent that he
is no longer in need of custody, care or treatment in a mental hospital ......
120. Id.
121. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9 (West 1982).
122. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
123. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
124. Id. at 574-75 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). In Fields,
the New Jersey Supreme Court cited both Jackson and O'Connor as constitutional
authority for its holding. See 77 N.J. at 294-97, 390 A.2d at 580-81. The nexus between
state and federal constitutional principles in this area is thus extremely strong.
125. See N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7(0.
126. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
127. The authors' review of Public Defender files reveals that a defendant who
is found NGRI after a trial is consistently found NGRI of the indictment itself. On
the other hand, a defendant whose trial results in a guilty verdict stands a chance
of being found guilty of only a part of the indictment or of a lesser included offense.
Therefore, the thrust of the New Jersey bill is further convoluted by the inability
to determine with any certainty the charges of which an NGRI defendant would other-
wise have been found guilty.
128. H.R. 6742, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4243(e) (1982).
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If the director made such a determination, he would file a certificate with the
clerk of the committing court, which would trigger a hearing. There is no pro-
vision in these bills for periodic judicial review of the current mental status
and dangerousness of the committed individual, such as occurs in New Jersey
pursuant to Krol and Fields. Yet requiring such procedures for NGRI defen-
dants is critical if the federal government is to offer a viable system of pro-
viding treatment for those who require it, while simultaneously protecting society
from those who pose a true danger to themselves or others. By establishing
a unified system for disposition of federal insanity acquittees, Congress can
seize the opportunity to remedy some serious constitutional flaws in the ex-
isting system." 9
At present, there is no uniform system through which the federal govern-
ment can insure that persons found NGRI receive adequate treatment, nor can
it insure that they are subject to restraints only when such restraints are necessary
to protect society. With the exception of the District of Columbia,'30 persons
acquitted by reason of insanity in a federal court are released from federal
custody.' 3' Civil commitment results only through essentially informal ar-
rangements between the federal courts or the United States Attorney and state
authorities. 32 Under this system, federal authorities retain no control over the
acquittee's release or his treatment. There is an extensive history of judicial
displeasure with this "undesirable gap in federal law,"' 3 as well as a record
of legislative proposals which have failed to be enacted into law.' 3
The federal disposition bills at least raise the possibility that this gap can
129. These flaws are currently being challenged in the federal appellate courts.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (en banc),
cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1411 (1982). The Division of Mental Health Advocacy has
argued that there should be no indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees; that
the burden of proof for commitment should be borne by the prosecuting authority;
and that there is no justification for any presumption of continuing insanity.
130. See 24 U.S.C. § 211 (1976) (requiring federal court finding a criminal defen-
dant to be insane to certify same to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
who may then order psychiatric commitment).
131. The courts of appeals in several circuits have examined 24 U.S.C. § 211
(1976), to determine whether or not its provisions for civil commitment apply outside
the District of Columbia. With the possible exception of the Sixth Circuit, none have
concluded that the statute providing for commitment to St. Elizabeth's Hospital applies
to persons acquitted outside the District. See infra note 133.
132. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 37.1-95 (1950 & Supp. 1981).
133. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 512, at 368 (2d ed.
1982). See, e.g., United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 416 n.14 (5th Cir. 1974);
Howard v. United States, 229 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), rev'd en banc, 232 F.2d 274
(5th Cir. 1956). But see Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 464 (6th Cir.), reh'g.
granted, 285 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1960), the reasoning of which was rejected by the Eighth
Circuit in Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 731 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651
(1968). See also United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1974) (general weight
of authority is that statute does not apply outside District).
134. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 979, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
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be filled and a uniform system imposed. The concerns noted earlier, however,
still remain. The New Jersey system has resulted in a workable balance of treat-
ment and security. NGRI acquittees who are declared a danger to the com-
munity remain hospitalized or subject to judicial oversight, while those who
are declared not dangerous may be released to appropriate civil treatment set-
tings. The New Jersey courts have engaged in a process of "gradual de-escalation
of restraints upon the [patient's] liberty,"' 35 rather than a wholesale release
of acquittees.
While periodic judicial review for NGRI acquittees is a hallmark of the
New Jersey system, that concept is totally lacking in the federal disposition
bills. The maximum length of confinement for such acquittees under the pro-
posed federal system is "the maximum sentence for the charge regarding which
a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity was returned."' 316 Another
disposition bill, introduced subsequent to congressional hearings on the package
of bills previously discussed,' 37 also fails to provide this mechanism.' 3 Were
the New Jersey approach to be adopted for federal NGRI acquittees, two im-
portant goals would be met: the provision of adequate treatment for such ac-
quittees, and the provision of meaningful protection to society from the ac-
quittee who, because of mental illness, is a danger to himself or to others.
D. The Role of Expert Testimony on Questions of Responsibility and
Dangerousness' "
The question of the proper role of expert testimony in judicial proceedings
in which the insanity defense is raised was addressed in several federal bills. ' 0
The ultimate question to be answered in a criminal trial where insanity is
raised is whether or not the defendant should be held responsible for his act.
It is not a question which can or should be answered by an expert witness.
"Responsibility is a legal concept, to be decided by the jury in accordance with
S. 2741, S. 2740, and S. 1007, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 3753 and S. 3689, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
135. State v. Fields, 77 N.J. at 303, 390 A.2d at 584 (emphasis added).
136. H.R. 6783, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4175(a) (1982).
137. See supra notes 52, 78, 79, 81-83, 111, 114.
138. See H.R. 7259, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
139. Subsequent to the hearings on September 9, 1982, before the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary,
the Subcommittee requested the Department of the Public Advocate to submit addi-
tional testimony on the role of expert testimony in trials where the insanity defense
is raised. This aspect of expert testimony had been addressed in various bills before
the Subcommittee and was clearly regarded by the legislators as a separate area of
particular concern. The discussion which follows herein reflects the views submitted
by the Department of the Public Advocate. H.R. 7259, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982),
introduced subsequent to the September 9, 1982 hearings, reflects some of the Depart-
ment's recommendations.
140. See, e.g., H.R. 7259, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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the rules laid down by the court."' 4 ' It is not for the expert witness to testify
in conclusive terms as to whether the defendant "knew right from wrong" or
"appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct." 4 2
Although Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence appears to adopt an
expansive view of the proper scope of expert testimony," 3 that rule "does not
lower the bars so as to admit all opinions."'14 4 Other rules "afford ample
assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury
what result to reach... and stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms
of inadequately explored legal criteria."' 4 Thus, under Rule 704, "courts must
remain vigilant against the admission of legal conclusions, and an expert witness
may not substitute for the court in charging the jury regarding the applicable
law.,, 146
This analysis raises what is, in essence, the threshold question to be asked:
has psychiatric expertise been sufficiently established to permit the general ad-
mission of opinion evidence in either insanity determinations or, as is especial-
ly relevant in post-acquittal commitment proceedings, in determinations of a
person's dangerousness?
141. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRMINAL DEFENSE 284 (1954). See
also 2 A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 97 (1967) ("There is widespread agree-
ment that an expert witness may rot be asked whether the defendant was 'responsi-
ble' "); G. MORRIS, TIE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
53-54 (1975); H. UNDERHILL, CRIMiNAL EVIDENCE § 463, at 1158 (5th ed. 1956).
142. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1017-21 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (overruled on other grounds by Brawner) ("[T]here
is no justification for permitting psychiatrists to testify on the ultimate issue [of whether
an accused's actions resulted from mental illness]." Id. at 456. Such a conclusion
"is not merely a summary of the underlying medical, psychological and social facts
[but it] is an opinion on whether or not the defendant should be found guilty."
Id. at 455-56 n.31). See also United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977) ("[Olpinion evidence cannot usurp
the functions of the jury. .. ").
143. "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible
is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
144. FED. R. EvID. 704, advisory committee note.
145. Id. referring to FED. R. EvID. 403, 701 & 702.
146. United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977). For a similar
provision under New Jersey law, see N.J.R. Evm. 56(3) and comment 9. See also
State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 520, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982) ("The policy underlying
Rule 56 is to exclude expert evidence when the danger it poses of prejudice, confusion
and diversion of attention exceeds its helpfulness to the fact finder because the expertise
is not sufficiently reliable."); State v. Vigliano, 50 N.J. 51, 72, 232 A.2d 129, 140
(1967) (opinion based on conjecture and speculation should be excluded as "invasion
of the jury province"); C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 12,
at 26 (1954) (noting "the danger that the jury may forego independent analysis of




As the opinion evidence doctrine has developed, "the opinion of witnesses
possessing peculiar skill is admissible whenever the subject matter of inquiry
is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to be capable of forming a cor-
rect judgment upon it, without such assistance,"" or where the witness has
"peculiar knowledge or experience not common to the world."" 8 An expert,
however, "cannot give an opinion without considering all the data, facts and
circumstances pertinent to the inquiry being made" and "cannot indulge in
mere speculation and surmise." "9 The expert's function "is to give an opinion
of fact . .. . [which] either is material in terms of the applicable law or ...
is not.''''0
The interpretation of this doctrine in analogous areas such as lie detectors,
voiceprints, and truth sera, reveals that in areas in which there is far greater
reliability than in predictability of dangerousness, greater accord as to the
witness' "peculiar skills" in forming opinions and far greater acceptance of
techniques within the scientific community as to a test's accuracy, such testimony
is, almost invariably, excluded."'
147. Pincus v. Sublett, 26 N.J. Super. 188, 192, 97 A.2d 712, 714 (App. Div. 1953).
148. Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 142, 72 A.2d 204, 207
(1950). Although New Jersey cases are predominantly referred to in this section, that
State's courts reflect the vast majority of American jurisdictions. See generally 7 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1917-1929, at 1-43 (1978).
149. Rempfer, 4 N.J. at 144-45, 72 A.2d at 208.
150. State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. Super. 38, 54, 285 A.2d 571, 580 (App. Div. 1972).
151. Testimony relating to polygraph testing is generally rejected because of "the
lack of scientific acceptance [of the test] as a reliable and accurate means of ascertain-
ing truth or deception." State v. Clark, 128 N.J. Super. 120, 126, 319 A.2d 247,
250 (App. Div. 1974). This holding stems partly from a finding that "the techniques
of the process enhance the possibility of error from interpretation." State v. Walker,
37 N.J. 208, 215, 181 A.2d 1, 5 (1962). Cf. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d
86 (1981) (analysis of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony).
Also, although polygraphs may be accurate in the range of 70-950o, the means
by which the examiner acquaints himself with the subject matter may be a source
of improper suggestion. As a result, unusual responsibility rests with the examiner,
and courts are reluctant to factor this uncontrolled variable into the traditional trial
process. Their response, so far, has been to hold that the results of such examinations
are still inadmissible where an objection is raised by the opposing party. See United
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973).
In summary, acceptance of polygraph testing is characterized as "in its infancy,"
and courts are still persuaded "to walk slowly and carefully in these early polygraph
days and until more universal and reliable scientific acceptance has been achieved."
State v. Smith, 142 N.J. Super. 575, 577, 579-80, 362 A.2d 578, 579, 581 (App.
Div. 1976). See also State v. Baskerville, 73 N.J. 230, 236, 374 A.2d 441, 444 (1977).
For a comparison of physical evidence testing and psychological evidence testing,
see Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974):
The court gave five reasons for excluding lie detector results: a) the possibility
that extraneous qualities or characteristics of the subject might yield erroneous
results; b) tendency of judges and juries to treat lie detector evidence as
conclusive; c) the lack of standardized testing procedures; d) the difficulty
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Psychiatric predictions of dangerousness do not meet the test for admissibili-
ty for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that psychiatrists possess any
"peculiar skill" in predicting dangerousness; to the contrary, many studies show
a "false positive" rate of 6007o to 70076.111 At least one major study has con-
cluded that judges "have a better prediction rate" than do psychiatrists." 3 There
is thus no reasonable certainty that such diagnoses are accurate. Second, it has
not been conclusively determined that psychiatric skill in predicting
dangerousness is "not common to the world."' 5 4 At least one commentator
has maintained that psychiatrists are less accurate predictors of dangerousness
than psychologists, social workers, or correctional officials.'"
Furthermore, the type of psychiatric interview generally relied upon as a
of evaluating examiner opinions; and e) the nonacceptance of the technique
by appropriate scientific bodies.
Each of these objections provides a cogent reason also to exclude psychiatric
judgments: a) extraneous qualities of psychiatric patients-such as their socio-
economic class-may substantially influence psychiatric judgments; b) judges
and juries usually defer to psychiatric judgments; c) psychiatric interview
procedures are unstandardized; d) it is difficult for judges and juries to evaluate
the validity of individal psychiatric judgments; and e) psychiatrists and
behavioral scientists who have studied the reliability and validity of psychiatric
judgments almost unanimously agree that such judgments are of low reliabili-
ty and validity.
Id. at 737 (footnote omitted) (discussing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274,
282, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962)).
As to voiceprints, in light of the high margin of error, and because of the very
nature of the test, it has been held that the "validity, reliability and veracity" of
voiceprint identification has not been demonstrated. See D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J.
Super. 553, 558-65, 385 A.2d 278, 281-84 (Ch. Div. 1978). Similarly, results of tests
administered under truth sera have been inadmissible "until the use of the drug as
a means of procuring the truth from people under its influence is accorded general
scientific recognition." State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 429, 132 A.2d 298, 310 (1957)
(quoting State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 273-74, 243 P.2d 325, 336 (1952)). This
holding was reaffirmed in State v. Levitt, 36 N.J. 266, 275, 176 A.2d 465, 470 (1961).
152. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 151, at 714. See also Cocozza & Steadman,
Some Refinements in the Measurement and Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 131
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1021 (1974); Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally
Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 397-98 (1972).
153. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 151, at 717. See also Usdin, Broad Aspects
of Dangerousness, in THE CLINICAL DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 43 (1967)
("We can make an educated guess, but what right does society have to act upon
a guess?"); Rappeport, Lassen & Gruenwald, Evaluations and Follow-up of State
Hospital Patients Who Had Sanity Hearings, 118 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1079, 1083 (1962).
154. Rempfer v. Deerfield Packing Corp., 4 N.J. 135, 142, 72 A.2d 204, 207
(1950). See also A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
33 (1975) ("It may well be that in many . .. situations a lay person can predict
dangerousness at least as well as a professional.").
155. See Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist's Power in Civil Commitment, 2 PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY 47 (1969).
In perhaps the clearest judicial statement of this position, the New York Appellate
[Vol. 14:397
LEGISLATIVE ASSA UL TS
basis for commitment does not regularly consider "all the data, facts and cir-
cumstances pertinent to the inquiry being made."' 56 For example, in the case
of In re R.B., the appellate court reversed a commitment order that had been
entered following testimony given by a psychiatrist whose opinion had been
based on "a single interview without any factual support founded in the past
actions of the patient or in prior manifestations of her mental illness .... ,,,57
There is a serious "possibility of error from interpretations,"'5 8 and there is
often "improper suggestion" in the manner in which the examiner acquaints
himself with the subject matter.159
Moreover, the scientific community has not demonstrated general accep-
tance or recognition of the accuracy of tests used to determine dangerousness.' 61
Even the American Psychiatric Association has acknowledged that "[n]either
psychiatrists nor anyone else has reliably demonstrated an ability to predict
future violence or 'dangerousness.' Neither hag any special psychiatric exper-
tise in this area been established." 16' Evidence dealing with psychiatric predic-
tability "in terms of experimental quantification and verifiability,"' 6 2 is far
Division remanded an NGRI release hearing for the taking of additional testimony
with the following observations:
Without disparaging or denigrating the profession of psychiatry, we suggest
that the witnesses summoned to the new hearing should include hospital
employees such as nurses, orderlies, housekeepers and others who have had
daily or frequent contact with petitioner. They will be able to relate to the
court petitioner's actions and reactions to the stresses and strains which are
experienced in the usual happenings of each day . ..It is suggested that
a display of ungovernable temper when one has been inconvenienced by a
housekeeper having just washed the floor may be more revealing and in-
dicative of future conduct than the impression one gives when he sits across
the desk or lies on the couch of a psychiatrist.
Application of Miller, 46 A.D.2d 177, 182-83, 362 N.Y.S.2d 628, 633-34 (App. Div. 1974).
156. Rempfer, 4 N.J. at 144-45, 72 A.2d at 208 (all pertinent information must
have been considered by psychiatrist if his opinion is to be admissible).
157. 158 N.J. Super. 542, 547, 386 A.2d 893, 896 (App. Div. 1978).
158. State v. Walker, 37 N.J. at 215, 181 A.2d at 5.
159. United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973). See generally
Ordway, Experiences in Evaluating Dangerousness in Private Practice and in a Court
Clinic, in THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF THE DANGEROUSNESS OF THE MENTALLY ILL
35 (1967) (clinicians may be influenced to conclude that lower socio-economic class
individuals are dangerous because such individuals are presumed to be impulsive and
thus more prone to violence; "[it sometimes seems that criteria for revaluating
dangerousness vary even when used by the same clinicians when they work in different
settings"); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 151, at 719-32; Dickes, Simons & Weisfogel,
Difficulties in Diagnosis Introduced by Unconscious Factors Present in the Interviews,
44 PSYCMATRY Q. 55 (1970) (unconscious conflicts of clinicians often cause distortions
in perception and misapprehension of patient's true condition).
160. See State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 429, 132 A.2d 298, 310 (1957).
161. American Psychiatric Ass'n, Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 28
(Task Force Report 8, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Clinical Aspects].
162. United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. at 514.
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closer to the nonphysical evidence of polygraphs, voiceprints, and the like, "and
a good bit more conjectural"' 3 than the physical evidence of ballistics or tox-
icology. The concerns of "mythic infallibility" expressed with regard to
voiceprints'" are equally pertinent here.
Finally, the reasons often given for rejecting polygraph testimony'65 are
similarly applicable to psychiatric predictions of dangerousness. Especially
troublesome is the deference which is shown by the court to psychiatric
judgments. The few empirical studies which have been done have revealed
uniformly that "the legal profession and the courts have surrendered a major
segment of their role in decision making regarding involuntary hospitalization,"
and that there is "an unquestioned assumption of expert infallibility by the
courts." 1' 6 The historical existence of this "assumption of expert infallibility"
demands far greater scrutiny than has ever been given this testimony. As the
Supreme Court recently noted: "Indeed, some in the psychiatric community
are of the view that clinical predictions as to whether a person would or would
not commit violent acts in the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability'
and that psychiatrists possess no special qualifications for making such
forecasts. " 167
Thus, psychiatric predictability of dangerousness meets none of the criteria
for general admissibility of opinion testimony. Moreover, the issue of
dangerousness is ultimately a legal question, not a medical one, 8 a concept
recognized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Krol.'69 There the court
stated that, while courts "should take full advantage of expert testimony
presented by the State and by the defendant, the decision is not one that can
be left wholly to the technical expertise of the psychiatrists and psychologists." 70
This principle was emphatically reaffirmed in State v. Fields.''
When read together, Krol, Fields, and their progeny'72 leave little doubt
163. United States ex rel. Wax v. Pate, 298 F. Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
164. See D'Arc v. D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. 553, 385 A.2d 278 (Ch. Div. 1978);
supra note 151.
165. See supra note 151.
166. Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric
Testimony: The Falibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L.
REv. 11, 31 (1976).
167. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981).
168. " 'Dangerousness' is neither a psychiatric nor a medical diagnosis." Clinical
Aspects, supra note 161, at 26. "It is not part of psychiatric training to evaluate
dangerousness... [Pisychiatric testimony, to the extent that it overextends the reasonable
boundaries of dangerousness, reflects an amalgam of ignorance, zeal, and self-
protectiveness." Brooks, Notes on Defining the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill,
in DANGEous BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH'37, 41, 44 (1978).
169. See 68 N.J. 236, 261, 344 A.2d at 289, 302 (1975).
170. Id.
171. See 77 N.J. 282, 307-09, 390 A.2d at 574, 587-88 (1978).
172. For restatements of Fields, see In re Newsome, 176 N.J. Super. 511, 516-17,
424 A.2d 222, 224-25 (App. Div. 1980); In re Scelfo, 170 N.J. Super. 394, 397, 406
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that the question is a legal one. Although psychiatric testimony may have eviden-
tial value, it cannot be considered dispositive.'1"
In sum, psychiatric predictability of dangerousness is considerably less
trustworthy than other opinion evidence traditionally rejected by the courts.
Groups such as the American Psychiatric Association agree with the courts that
dangerousness is a legal issue. At most, some psychiatric opinions may be eviden-
tial, but they should not be seen as either controlling or conclusive.
III. CONCLUSION
The legislation which has been suggested-by President Reagan and
others-is based on the perpetuation of myths. It represents an unnecessary
and extreme reaction to a group of serious misconceptions. The facts, as reflected
by the New Jersey experience, disprove each and every one of the false premises
in question. To abolish or eviscerate the defense in an attempt to respond to
these misconceptions would be shortsighted, unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive. An examination of the evidence reflects no less.
A.2d 973, 975 (App. Div. 1979) (applying Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433
(1979) (burden of proof), retroactively to NGRI committees). A portion of the language
in question has -since been cited with approval by the Third Circuit. See Artway v.
Pallone, 672 F.2d 1168, 1175-76 n.9 (3d Cir. 1982).
173. See J. ZISKIN, COPING wrrH PSYCHIATRIC AND PsYcHoLoGICAL TESTIMONY
219-21 (2d ed. 1975) (citing studies showing "no practical differences" in degree of
accuracy of psychologists, psychological trainees and hospital secretaries in distinguishing
brain-damaged psychiatric patients through the use of the Bender-Gestalt test).
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TABLE IV
PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN OF CASES INVOLVING PSYCHIATRIC







NGI 15 19% .046
Guilty 22 30076 .068
Open Pending Competence 27 36% .083
Dismissed 4 5% .012
Not Guilty 1 1% .001
Incompetent to Stand Trial
(closed case) 8 9% .025
TABLE V
CATEGORIES OF PRIMARY CHARGES OF NGI CASES
IN SUR VEY, FISCAL YEAR 1982
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TABLE VI
BREAKDOWN OF SENTENCES RESULTING FROM GUILTY
VERDICTS IN SURVEY OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY,
FISCAL YEAR 1982
Of Guilty Cases, Number of Specific Sentences Per Charge
Murder (8)
Custodial (ordinary terms) 4
Life imprisonment 1
Indeterminate 2
Not yet sentenced 1
Assault (6)




Custodial (ordinary terms) 3
Referred to private attorney 1
Custodial (extended terms) 1
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TABLE VII
SPECIFIC SENTENCE RESULTS FOR GUILTY VERDICTS IN














Life + 40 yrs.
125 yrs.
Not yet sentenced












18 mos. suspended, 3 yrs. probation
5 yrs., 9 mos.
* "Unavailable" denotes cases where the exact sentences could not be obtained
from records.
[Vol. 14:397
